Making sense of the hysteria around the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in South Africa’s livestock industry

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) among cattle in South Africa has spread aggressively since 2019, affecting eight of the country’s nine provinces and severely disrupting the commercial livestock value chain in many areas.

The disease will result in lost Gross Production Value and affect animal welfare. The emotional toll on livestock and dairy producers is massive.

Many producers will face financial disaster. It is therefore no wonder that industry role-players and farmers are up in arms and very angry.

This is well understood, but what is concerning is that everyone seems to have become an overnight expert on the disease, while there are only a few experts and veterinarians in South Africa who have successfully managed previous FMD outbreaks. We have spoken with one expert, Dr Gideon Brückner, to get his views on the current mudslinging and accusations being made.

He immediately drew our attention to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) rules and guidelines on the treatment of FMD. South Africa is a signatory to this agreement and must comply with the rules to regain its FMD-free status. (Dr Brückner was also the Head of the WOAH for many years after completing years of service as the Director of Veterinary Services in the Department of Agriculture).

He fully agrees with the State's decision to control vaccine production and imports. Minister John Steenhuisen is absolutely right in doing this. There is more than enough support for it in the WOAH international standards of which SA is a member, as well as in the Animal Diseases Act of 1984. There are, therefore, more than enough provisions in international agreements that contradict the unsubstantiated claims some have publicly made.

The essence of the argument is that there is no objection if private veterinarians assist with the vaccination, but the procurement of vaccines and monitoring of where and what and how many animals have been vaccinated must be strictly monitored by the State to maintain its reputation and standards internationally if the plan is to after the waiting period is over, to apply again for South Africa to be declared free of foot-and-mouth disease with vaccination by the WOAH.

If there is no order and no controlled processes, we will never regain that important status, and our export markets for red meat will remain closed!

More importantly, however, if poorly inactivated vaccines are purchased by anybody, it can introduce unwanted FMD viruses that could cause more than a national disaster. This is because all split-hoofed animals in South Africa (including wildlife) are naïve to any other FMD virus except the SAT 1, 2, and 3 strains, and thus are highly susceptible.

In particular, the O strain, which is not present here, can cause significant harm because it is highly virulent, highly contagious, and highly pathogenic in pigs (the same virus was illegally introduced into KZN in 2001 and was eradicated quickly through total slaughter). There are suspicions that it may already have been in vaccines illegally imported from Kenya.

Based on the anger expressed on social media, it is clear that very few people are aware of WOAH’s vaccine guidelines. We provide some relevant extracts from their guidelines to ensure people can understand that there is some legal merit for the State’s actions:

Chapter 1.1.8 of the WOAH Terrestrial Manual provides clear guidance on how each government should address a disease and the release of vaccines.

Before release of a vaccine for use in a country, relevant regulatory approval must be requested from and be assessed and authorised by the competent authority to ensure compliance with local product regulatory requirements.

Starting materials to be used, manufacturing steps, in-process controls and controls on the finished product before release by a responsible person should be described in the dossier for relevant regulatory approval, as should be the necessary tests to demonstrate quality, safety, and efficacy of the vaccine.

After the relevant regulatory approval has been granted by a competent authority, the industrial production can be launched in a manufacturing site which is authorised by the competent authority in accordance with national requirements and having the relevant equipment, facilities and personnel for production and controls. The manufacturing site should be inspected on a regular basis by experienced official inspectors.

A section in the manual specifies clearly how vaccines should be administered:

All veterinary vaccines administered to animals should be tested for field safety and, if feasible, for efficacy in the field, before being authorised for general use. Field studies are designed to demonstrate safety and efficacy under conditions of normal environment, care and use, and should detect unexpected reactions, including mortality that may not have been observed during the development of the product.

Under field conditions there are many uncontrollable variables that make it difficult to obtain good efficacy data, but demonstration of safety is more reliable. The tests should be done on the host animal, at a variety of geographical locations, using appropriate numbers of susceptible animals.

The test animals should represent all the ages and husbandry practices for which the product is indicated; unvaccinated controls must be included. The product tested should be two or more typical production batches/serials. A protocol should be developed indicating the observation methods and the recording methods.

Chapter 3.1.8 of the Terrestrial Manual on FMD vaccines provides further clear direction on strain selection.

Appropriate vaccine strain selection is an important element in the control of FMD and is necessary for the application of vaccination programmes in FMD-affected regions as well as for the establishment and maintenance of vaccine antigen reserves to be used in the event of new FMD incursions. The decision to change or include new strains in vaccine formulations is a multifaceted process and, among other issues, experimental, epidemiological and field observations should be considered.

Vaccination against one serotype of FMDV does not cross-protect against other serotypes and may also fail to protect fully or at all against other strains of the same serotype.

We finally need to correct the false claims made by many organisations and clarify why the State controls FMD Vaccination

First, FMD is a controlled animal disease under the Animal Diseases Act (Act 35 of 1984) and requires the State to take control measures. Clause 20 of Act 35 is also of particular relevance to the development and manufacturing of vaccines. The designation of a disease as a controlled animal disease is because any unregulated vaccination can:

• Mask infection,

• Spread the virus mechanically,

• Undermine surveillance,

• Jeopardise WOAH FMD‑free status.

The national strategy stresses that vaccination must be part of a “centrally managed, technically rigorous programme”.

Clearly, the poor record of the Department of Agriculture and its provincial departments in managing FMD and other important matters related to animal biosecurity has contributed to the hysteria and unfounded accusations.

The officials in the Department have not done themselves any favour and have, in a way, contributed to the crisis. As we have highlighted in our book “The Uncomfortable Truth About South Africa’s Agriculture”, the problems with animal biosecurity in South Africa have been compounded by persistent institutional failures, including fragmented governance, weak coordination between national and provincial authorities, and systemic challenges in vaccine production, procurement, and distribution (e.g., cold-chain infrastructure failures and ageing equipment).

The FMD outbreak is a national crisis that will affect all livestock farmers, from small-scale keepers to large feedlots, and will negatively impact industry growth. It is time that we are responsible and that only the experts talk about vaccines and disease matters. It is also time for the Department to get its act together and work collaboratively with those who can manufacture, distribute, and apply vaccines.